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Foreword | Legal threshold quantities 
for drug trafficking, over which 
possession of an illicit drug is deemed 
‘trafficking’ as opposed to ‘personal 
use’ are used in most Australian states 
and territories. Yet, in spite of known 
risks from adopting such thresholds, 
most notably of unjustified conviction of 
users as traffickers, the capacity of 
Australian legal thresholds to deliver 
proportional sanctioning has been 
subject to limited research. 
In this study, the authors use data on 
patterns of drug user consumption and 
purchasing to evaluate Australian legal 
threshold quantities to see whether 
Australian drug users are at risk of 
exceeding the thresholds for personal 
use alone. The results indicate that 
some, but not all users are at risk, with 
those most likely to exceed current 
thresholds being consumers of MDMA 
and residents of New South Wales and 
South Australia. The implication is that 
even if the current legal threshold 
system helps to convict and sanction 
drug traffickers, it may be placing 
Australian drug users at risk of 
unjustified charge or sanction. The 
authors highlight a number of reforms 
that ought mitigate the risks and 
increase capacity to capture Australian 
drug traffickers.
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Drug trafficking in Australia is deemed a very serious offence, one for which legislators and 
courts have ruled general deterrence is paramount and ‘little mercy’ should be shown (Clune 
[1989] VR 567, O’Bryan and Marks JJ, 576). A principal challenge has been how to effectively 
differentiate and sanction participants in the drug trade—particularly how to differentiate 
‘traffickers’ from those who consume or purchase illicit drugs for personal use alone (people 
whom legislators and courts have determined ought be sanctioned more leniently; MCCOC 
1998b). To assist in this endeavour, all Australian states and territories have adopted legal 
thresholds that specify quantities of drugs over which offenders are either presumed to have 
possessed the drugs ‘for the purposes of supply’ and liable to sanction as ‘drug traffickers’ 
(up to 15 years imprisonment in most states), or in the case of Queensland, liable to sanctions 
equivalent to drug traffickers (up to 25 years imprisonment). Yet, in spite of known risks from 
adopting such thresholds, particularly of an unjustified conviction of a user as a trafficker, the 
capacity of Australian legal thresholds to deliver proportional sanctioning has been subject to 
limited research to date. This paper summarises key findings from a Criminology Research 
Grant funded project. The broader project examined this issue in two different ways—
whether the thresholds are designed to filter traffickers from users and whether they enable 
appropriate sanctioning of traffickers of different controlled drugs. Herein, the focus is on the 
former—to what extent Australian legal thresholds unwittingly place users at risk of unjustified 
and disproportionate charge or sanction as traffickers.
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Legal thresholds for drug 
offences
Legal thresholds are significant yet 
controversial tools in the sentencing of 
drug offenders (Hughes 2010a, 2003). 
Many countries explicitly avoid their use 
(eg France). A minority of countries specify 
actual quantities (eg Germany; Hughes 
2010a, 2003). Australia falls into this 
latter, minority category. Moreover, among 
countries that choose to employ legal 
thresholds, there is variation in how they are 
employed, whether for example they are 
used to distinguish traffickers from users 
or to distinguish between different levels 
of drug trafficking or to trigger the type 
of sanction warranted for users (Hughes 
2010a, 2003). That said, legal thresholds 
are used primarily to facilitate responses to 
high-level offenders; that is, drug traffickers.
Proponents of the use of threshold 
quantities argue that they are the optimal 
means to guarantee that drug offenders 
receive the sanction that they deserve 
(MCCOC 1998b; Sentencing Council 2011). 
Concern is that without legal thresholds, 
there would be more opportunity for 
prosecutorial and sentencing abuse, leading 
to more adverse sentencing outcomes 
(such as sanctioning traffickers for simple 
possession or ‘Mr Bigs’ with overly lenient 
terms). This, is turn, could foster higher 
levels of community dissatisfaction and 
lower deterrence for current and would-
be traffickers. Conversely, opponents of 
threshold quantities argue that specification 
of a quantity of drug as the ‘cut off’ 
between offences can unwittingly lead to 
inappropriate or unjust sentencing of drug 
offenders. A key risk is that users who 
possess large quantities will be presumed 
to be trafficking and erroneously imprisoned 
as traffickers (Harris 2011b; Walsh 2008). 
This view is supported by a US study by 
Sevigny and Caulkins (2006) which showed 
that in 1997, 11.9 percent of US federal and 
15.6 percent of state inmates convicted of 
drug trafficking self-reported no trafficking 
involvement. Instead, at both the time 
of conviction and the year leading to the 
conviction, they were users/possessors 
only. Opponents of legal thresholds also 
argue that they may unwittingly provide 
perverse incentives for high-level traffickers 
to modify their behaviour to reduce their risk 
of severe sanction (through, for example 
ensuring mules hold their drugs rather than 
themselves). In so doing, it is feared that 
thresholds reduce the capacity to sanction 
drug traffickers on the basis of their intended 
or actual harm.
For both proponents and opponents 
concern is twofold. First, there has yet to 
be any systematic assessment of the risks 
(and benefits) of thresholds. Second, the 
methods by which existing quantitative 
thresholds have been devised have been 
largely ad hoc and non-transparent. As 
summarised at an international meeting on 
threshold quantities,
how these figures were set...is not a 
calculation for which the workings are 
generally in the public domain, nor did 
some jurisdictions retain their workings 
out even in the private domain (Harris 
2011b: 9).
This increases the likelihood that existing 
thresholds will have unintended and 
undesirable policy outcomes.
Legal thresholds for drug 
trafficking in Australia
As noted above, Australia is in the minority 
of countries that specify quantities for 
distinguishing between drug offences with 
different penalty scales. Most Australian 
states and territories employ three different 
thresholds—a trafficable threshold (that 
distinguishes crimes of ‘low-level trafficking’ 
versus ‘possession for personal use’), a 
commercial threshold and a large commercial 
threshold (Hughes 2010b). Each triggers 
increasingly severe penalty ranges that 
can be applied, such as up to 15 years 
imprisonment for a trafficable quantity and life 
imprisonment for a large commercial quantity 
in New South Wales (Drug Misuse and 
Trafficking Act, 1986 (NSW)). Queensland 
employs prescribed quantities in a different 
way—triggering penalties equal to drug 
trafficking, rather than an actual charge or 
sanction as a drug trafficker (Drug Misuse 
Act 1986 (Qld)). Nevertheless, in all Australian 
states and territories, possession of the 
base-level threshold quantities triggers 
elevated maximum penalty ranges. This is 
particularly when compared with the sanction 
for simple use or possession—a maximum of 
two years imprisonment or a more probably, 
a simple caution or diversion (and no criminal 
record; Hughes & Ritter 2008).
The specific threshold quantities employed 
vary by drug type, by jurisdiction and 
whether they are measured in terms of the 
pure chemical compound of a drug (pure 
grams) or, more commonly, in terms of 
pure chemical and any inert substances 
and fillers that are added before sale on the 
street (mixed grams or admixtures). Table 1 
outlines the trafficable threshold quantities 
for heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, 
MDMA and cannabis. It shows that in all 
jurisdictions, the quantities for cannabis 
are larger than for any other drug. Indeed, 
Table 1  Trafficable threshold quantities in Australian states and territories by jurisdiction and 
drug type (mixed grams)
Jurisdiction Heroin
Meth/
amphetamine Cocaine MDMA/ecstasy Cannabis
NT 2 2 2 0.5 50
WA 2 2 2 2 100
SA 2 2 2 2 250
Vic 3 3 3 3 250
NSW 3 3 3 0.75 300
ACTa 8.1 (2) 20 (2) 3.3 (2) 3.3 (0.5) 300
Qlda 10.8 (2) 14.6 (2) 10.5 (2) 9.6 (2) 500
Tas 25 25 25 10 1,000
a: Threshold quantities in these jurisdictions are listed per pure gram (shown in brackets). They have been converted for the current analysis 
into ‘mixed grams’ based on the median 2010–11 retail purity in each state for seizures ≤2 grams (ACC 2012)
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they are 25–200 times larger. Moreover, 
there is wide variation across states. Most 
notably, Tasmania employs considerably 
greater threshold quantities for all illicit 
drugs. Reasons for such differences 
remain unknown.
In all jurisdictions except Queensland, 
Australian drug trafficking thresholds 
are attached to deemed supply laws, 
which reverse the traditional burden of 
proof from prosecutors onto defendants. 
Such laws mean that possession of the 
trafficable threshold amount will constitute 
a presumption of trafficking placing the 
onus on the alleged offender to prove that 
the possessed amount was not for the 
purposes of trafficking (‘deemed supply’). 
While such provisions have been justified 
in terms of assisting in the successful 
prosecution of drug traffickers, they are 
unique relative to most other drug trafficking 
threshold systems across the world, where 
deemed supply laws are explicitly avoided 
(Harris 2011a; Hughes 2003; Walsh 2008). 
They also conflict with standard criminal 
justice principles, such as the presumption 
of innocence and the burden of proof being 
placed on the prosecutor, rather than the 
defendant (Judicial College of Victoria 2012).
Policy context
In Australia, the issue of drug trafficking 
thresholds has risen to the fore, mainly 
in the context of concern about the lack 
of consistency across drug quantities in 
different state systems. Recognition of 
the lack of uniformity led to specification 
of the Australian Model Criminal Code of 
serious drug offences (MCCOC 1998b) and 
a single set of threshold quantities for all 
states and territories in Australia to adopt 
(set for a trafficable threshold quantity at 2 
mixed grams of heroin, methamphetamine, 
cocaine or MDMA and 250 grams of 
cannabis). To date, only one state, South 
Australia, has enacted such changes. 
Enactment by other jurisdictions would 
lower most threshold quantities, particularly 
in Tasmania, but also in the Australian Capital 
Territory, Queensland, New South Wales and 
Victoria. There has been an increasing 
push for all states and territories to adopt 
the proposed threshold quantities (AGD 
2011; NDS 2007). Yet, a rational basis for 
whether current or proposed thresholds 
are fit for purpose, that is, whether they 
enable proportionate sanction, has been 
largely ignored.
The exception to this has been the Australian 
Capital Territory. In 2011, Hughes and 
Ritter (in press) were commissioned by 
the Australian Capital Territory (Justice and 
Community Safety Directorate) to evaluate 
the current and proposed Model Criminal 
Code quantities. In conducting this work, 
five new metrics were developed and 
applied to evaluate drug trafficking threshold 
design, using Australian and international 
research evidence on drug user behaviour 
and drug markets. Application to the ACT 
setting showed that the current thresholds 
created risks of unjustified sanction of 
users as traffickers and that by virtue of 
their lower values, the proposed Model 
Criminal Code thresholds, if adopted, would 
pose greater risks (particularly for users of 
methamphetamine; Hughes & Ritter in press).
This study
In this study, the ACT work was extended to 
evaluate the most pertinent drug trafficking 
threshold—the trafficable threshold—in 
six Australian states (New South Wales, 
Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, 
Tasmania and Western Australia) against 
drug user behaviour and knowledge of 
Australian drug markets. The Australian 
Capital Territory and the Northern Territory 
were excluded from this analysis for two 
reasons—the prior analysis of the Australian 
Capital Territory (Hughes & Ritter in press) 
and lack of adequate data on illicit drug use 
and purchasing for the Northern Territory. 
Specific goals of relevance for this paper 
were to:
•	 evaluate whether the trafficable thresholds 
allow the prosecution and the judiciary 
to properly distinguish drug users from 
traffickers;
•	 compare and contrast threshold design 
across Australia, taking into account 
interstate differences in current legal 
thresholds and drug markets;
•	 determine whether the problems identified 
with the ACT drug trafficking thresholds 
are common across state systems.
Methods
The method replicated the approach of 
Hughes and Ritter (in press). Analysis was 
confined to examining the thresholds for 
heroin, methamphetamine, cocaine, MDMA 
(also known as ecstasy) and cannabis (leaf 
not whole plant form). Threshold quantities 
for Queensland were converted into mixed 
grams (admixtures) based on the 2010–11 
retail purity (ACC 2012) as listed in Table 
1. This was necessary given all available 
data on which thresholds can be evaluated 
(patterns of use and purchasing) concerning 
admixtures.
For each state, the ability of the legal 
threshold to successfully filter out drug users 
from drug traffickers (ie the reasonableness 
of the assumption that all who exceed the 
trafficable threshold warrant severe charge/
sanction for trafficking) was examined using 
two metrics of the quantity of drug a user is 
likely to possess for personal use alone:
Metric 1: User patterns of use; that is, 
quantity of drugs that a user is likely to 
possess for a single session of personal use.
Metric 2: User patterns of purchasing; that 
is, quantity of drugs that a user is likely to 
purchase for personal use.
Data were derived from three different 
national surveys—two of regular drug users 
(the Illicit Drug Reporting System: IDRS and 
the Ecstasy and related Drug Reporting 
System: EDRS) and one from the general 
population (the National Drug Strategy 
Household Survey: NDSHS). The IDRS 
and EDRS are national monitoring systems 
that survey regular (at least monthly) drug 
users on an annual basis. They have been 
designed to target different populations—
regular injecting users, predominantly heroin 
(IDRS) and regular ecstasy users (EDRS). 
In 2011, a total of 868 users participated 
in IDRS (Stafford & Burns 2012) and 693 
in the EDRS (Sindicich & Burns 2012). 
These surveys provide data on patterns of 
drug use (under both typical and heavy use 
sessions), purchasing behaviour, typical 
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street prices and a number of other user and 
market characteristics. There are limitations 
to the IDRS and EDRS. Of relevance here, 
users of cocaine are underrepresented in 
the sample (Degenhardt & Dietze 2005). 
The surveys also omit users who consume 
substances less frequently. Accordingly, 
data on quantity of drug consumed was 
also sourced from the 2010 NDSHS (AIHW 
2011). The NDSHS is a representative 
sample of the general Australian population 
that is conducted every three years. In 
2010, more than 26,000 people from all 
Australian jurisdictions aged 12 years and 
over were sampled (AIHW 2011).
To calculate Metric 1, raw data on all three 
samples (IDRS, EDRS and NDSHS) were 
used.  For each survey, data on ‘quantity 
consumed’ in a typical and heavy session 
was extracted by state, then dosage 
conversions applied (to convert all dosage 
units into grams) and the mean, median 
and range calculated by state and by 
drug type. The upper quantities were 
checked with a number of key experts 
(n=6) to verify if they were within the 
maximum range that could be consumed 
in a single continuous session of use 
without sleep. Those quantities deemed 
implausible were removed; for example, 
reported consumption of 20 grams of 
heroin which would be toxic. The final 
quantities were then compared against 
the actual trafficable thresholds to identify 
for each drug and state two things—first, 
whether most users consume less than the 
threshold quantity in a single continuous 
session of use (using median and mean 
estimates) and second, whether there is 
risk to any users of an unjustified charge/
conviction; that is, whether the maximum 
possessed is equal to or greater than the 
trafficable threshold.
This process was repeated for Metric 
2 using data from the IDRS and EDRS 
only (data on purchasing was unavailable 
from the NDSHS). Data on ‘last purchase 
amount’ was extracted by state and drug 
type, dosage conversions applied, data 
cross-checked with experts and then 
estimates compared against the actual 
threshold quantities. To provide added 
surety that estimates were derived from 
users not user-dealers, purchase amounts 
from offenders who reported ‘any dealing for 
cash profit in the last month’ were excluded. 
This led to removal of 27 percent (n=237) 
of the national IDRS sample (n=868) and 
28 percent (n=160) of the national EDRS 
sample (n=574).
Results
The results are complex, as there are 
a large number of datasets crossing 
different populations, patterns of drug user 
behaviour and jurisdictions. Nevertheless, 
most median and mean quantities that 
Australian drug users reported consuming 
or purchasing were lower than the trafficable 
thresholds. That said, the maximum quantity 
consumed or purchased for personal use 
alone exceeded the trafficable quantity 
for most drug types. This is exemplified 
by considering patterns of consumption 
and purchasing from two of the five drugs 
examined—heroin and MDMA.
Under typical conditions, heroin users 
reported consuming a median quantity of 
0.2 to 0.3 grams of heroin; well under the 
trafficable threshold of two to 25 grams. 
However as shown in Table 2, examining the 
maximum quantity that a heroin user might 
be reasonably expected to possess for their 
personal use alone, users can equal or 
exceed the thresholds in one state for a typical 
session of use, in three states for a heavy 
session and in two states for purchasing. 
Indeed, heroin users in New South Wales can 
consume up to double the threshold quantity 
for their personal use alone.
For MDMA, under typical conditions, most 
users again reported consuming less than 
the thresholds. For example, most irregular 
users reported consuming a median 
quantity of 0.25 to 0.41 grams of MDMA 
(approximately 1 pill) and most regular users 
reported consuming 0.58 to 0.73 grams 
(approximately 2 pills). This is under the 
trafficable threshold of 0.75 to 10 grams. 
However, as shown in Table 3, examining the 
maximum quantity that an MDMA user might 
be reasonably expected to possess for their 
personal use alone, users can exceed the 
thresholds in two states for a typical session 
of use, in four states for a heavy session and 
in all six states for purchasing.
Table 2 Maximum quantity of heroin used or purchased by state, compared with the current 
trafficable threshold quantity
State
Current trafficable 
threshold quantity
Maximum quantity 
heroin used  
(typical session)
Maximum quantity 
heroin used  
(heavy session)
Maximum 
quantity heroin 
purchased
NSW 3.0 3.0 6.0 3.5
Vic 3.0 2.0 4.0 3.5
Qld 10.8 1.2 6.0 3.5
SA 2.0 1.5 1.5 1.0
WA 2.0 1.0 2.0 1.0
Tas 25.0 1.5 5.0 1.0
Table 3 Maximum quantity of MDMA used or purchased by state, compared with the current 
trafficable threshold quantity
State
Current trafficable 
threshold quantity
Maximum quantity 
MDMA used  
(typical session)
Maximum quantity 
MDMA used  
(heavy session) 
Maximum quantity 
MDMA purchased
NSW 0.75 3.5 6.7 14.5
Vic 3.0 1.6 5.8 58.0
Qld 9.6 2.0 8.7 29.0
SA 2.0 2.9 7.3 29.0
WA 2.0 1.5 3.5 29.0
Tas 10.0 2.2 7.3 29.0
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This indicates that Australian drug users are 
unlikely to exceed the trafficable threshold 
under normal circumstances, but that when 
using or purchasing their ‘highest doses’, 
many do exceed the thresholds. While it 
must be emphasised that circumstances 
of high use and purchase are not going to 
occur all the time, this clearly shows the 
erroneousness of the assumption that the 
thresholds effectively filter out all users from 
traffickers. The question arises, which users 
are at risk and how often will this occur?
Which users are most at risk?
It is clear that the risks of exceeding the 
thresholds vary considerably across drug 
types. For example, as shown in Table 3, in 
every state regular ecstasy users reported 
consuming and/or purchasing quantities for 
personal use that exceeded the trafficable 
threshold. By contrast, cannabis users 
have the least evidence of exceeding 
the thresholds, with no instance where a 
cannabis user consumes more than the 
trafficable quantity and only one instance 
where the maximum purchased exceeded 
the trafficable threshold quantity. Indeed, 
with one exception, the maximum quantities 
reported by cannabis users were 3.5–35 
times under the threshold.
Instances of exceeding the thresholds are 
also greater when examining practices of 
regular users, rather than irregular users, 
and for considering patterns of ‘heavy’ use, 
rather than patterns of ‘typical’ use.
That said, they biggest determinant of 
risk is the state. Some states have almost 
no evidence that users exceed current 
thresholds for personal use alone (eg 
Tasmania and Queensland, reflecting 
in large part the much higher trafficable 
thresholds). By contrast, other states 
show that users are at risk of exceeding 
the thresholds across multiple drug types. 
Of particular note here are New South 
Wales and South Australia where users risk 
exceeding the thresholds for consumption 
or purchase of three different drugs—
MDMA, methamphetamine and/or cocaine.
It is difficult to definitively estimate what 
proportion and how often users are placed 
at risk of unjustified charge or sanction. 
This is due to gaps in knowledge about 
the frequency of high use and purchase 
behaviour. The current data suggests a 
small but not insignificant proportion of 
heroin users are affected. For example, 
in a heavy session of use, 4.2 percent, 
4.6 percent and 11.3 percent of regular 
heroin users in Western Australian, New 
South Wales and Victoria respectively 
consumed equal to or more than the 
current thresholds (the frequency of heavy 
sessions is unknown). More concerning is 
the proportion of affected MDMA users. For 
example 19 percent, 31 percent and 57 
percent of regular MDMA users in Western 
Australia, South Australia and New South 
Wales respectively purchased more than 
the current trafficable threshold quantity 
on their last MDMA purchase (risks in 
other states were much smaller—3 to 
6.5%). Moreover, in a heavy session, 80 
percent of regular users in New South 
Wales reported consuming more than 
the trafficable threshold quantity (18% 
in Western Australia and 30% in South 
Australia). Such behaviour is of concern, 
not only because of the number of regular 
MDMA users exceeding the thresholds, but 
also because binging (ie high quantity use; 
Sindicich & Burns 2102) and stockpiling (ie 
high-quantity purchases) are both common 
behaviours among regular MDMA users 
(Fowler, Kinner & Krenske 2007).
Policy implications
The approach taken in this work is subject to 
the limits of currently available data. A number 
of desirable indices such as ‘purchases 
under heavy conditions’ were unavailable. 
Moreover, sample sizes for a number of 
estimates were small, which likely reduces 
their reliability. Further data on the frequency 
of high consumption and high purchasing 
behaviours is also needed. Nevertheless, this 
is the best available data to date and provides 
considerable insight into the Australian drug 
trafficking threshold system.
The findings suggest that users are at 
minimal risk of exceeding the trafficable 
thresholds when they follow typical use and 
purchase patterns, but that when using or 
purchasing high doses many can exceed 
the thresholds for their personal use alone. 
This is particularly true for MDMA and for 
users in the states of New South Wales 
and South Australia. This provides clear 
evidence that thresholds in such instances 
are too low relative to patterns of drug use. 
Equally importantly, while the results support 
the findings from the Australian Capital 
Territory of thresholds posing clear risks 
to users, they also show how risks can be 
mitigated with better design—namely with 
thresholds that better reflect using patterns 
in the particular state of concern and 
how the wholesale adoption of the Model 
Criminal Code quantities across Australia 
would serve to increase the likelihood of a 
drug user being unjustly charged and/or 
sanctioned for trafficking (MCCOC 1998b).
More generally, the findings suggest that 
instances of users exceeding the threshold 
quantity identified would be much less 
problematic if the threshold quantity were 
not also linked to the ‘deemed supply’ laws. 
The question arises—to what extent is it 
reasonable to expect a drug user in such 
circumstances to prove the absence of 
trafficking or intent to traffic?
Such a question has particular importance 
for three reasons. First, the deeming 
provision that reverses the onus of proof onto 
alleged drug offenders found in possession 
of the threshold quantity or greater is highly 
exceptional, compared with other countries’ 
drug trafficking thresholds and the standard 
Australian law and criminal justice responses 
to serious crimes. For example, even for 
offences of murder and manslaughter, the 
onus remains on the prosecution to prove 
guilt (MCCOC 1998a). The supremacy of 
the principle of prosecutorial burden of proof 
has been for good reason. Second, the drug 
users who find themselves at the margins of 
the drug trafficking thresholds are most likely 
to be the more marginalised users (eg more 
unemployed and socially disadvantaged; 
Stafford & Burns 2012), which reduces 
their capacity to successfully prevent an 
unjust sanction. Third, it is known that an 
‘unjustified conviction for dealing will often 
impose social and individual harms which 
far exceed the harm associated with the 
drug in question’ (MCCOC 1998b: 87). This 
is particularly true in this case as, across all 
states, it is users of MDMA who are most at 
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risk of unjustified sanction—a drug that when 
compared across both licit and illicit drugs 
has been shown to be least likely to cause 
crime or health and societal harm (Nutt, 
King & Phillips 2010).
Two additional solutions are suggested. 
The first solution is to abolish the deemed 
supply provisions—to place the onus back 
on the prosecutor to prove trafficking intent 
(or intent for preparation for trafficking) 
based on evidence such as scales, multiple 
bags, telephone records, etc. The fact 
that this is how police and prosecutors 
operate in Queensland, France and most 
other criminal justice systems (Hughes 
2010a) shows this is not only possible but 
a more common practice. Under such 
a situation, circumstances where users 
exceed the thresholds would be much 
less troubling, as in the absence of any 
additional evidence of trafficking intent, the 
user would be appropriately charged with 
a simple possession offence (and liable 
to a much smaller maximum penalty eg 2 
years imprisonment). The second solution, 
if deemed supply laws are retained, is that 
threshold quantities be elevated to exceed 
the maximum quantities identified for 
personal use. Given this would necessitate 
much larger quantities in some cases (eg 
29 grams of MDMA), this may well be a 
less potentially feasible option.
In conclusion, legal thresholds for drug 
trafficking have long been central to the 
Australian response to drug offenders, 
justified under goals of delivering 
proportionality and effective responses to 
those who inflict widespread suffering—
drug traffickers (MCCOC 1998b). What is 
clear from this analysis is that, even if the 
system helps to convict and sanction drug 
traffickers, the current legal threshold system 
is placing Australian drug users at risk of 
unjustified charge or sanction. This is due to 
both the particular quantities adopted and 
the idiosyncratic Australian criminal justice 
response to drug traffickers which removes 
the normal criminal justice safeguard of the 
burden of proof resting with the prosecution. 
However, it is also clear that the level of 
risk can be mitigated by better design. It 
is thus hoped that the data herein will help 
build threshold systems that adopt and 
deliver more proportional, just and equitable 
responses to Australian drug offenders.
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